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Abstract
The differential diagnosis of hematuria, blood in the urine, is
studied from the point of view of identifying crucial structures and
processes in medical diagnosis. The thesis attempts to fit the problem
of medical diagnosis into the framework of other A.I. problems and
paradigms and in.particular explores the notions of pure search vs.
heuristic methods, linearity and interaction, plausibility and the
structure of hypotheses within the world of kidney disease.
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Writing a program, inventing a formalism or working out a method
to solve a problem is an activity which can be viewed in two very
different lights. Its most immediate goal is to produce a working
program or simulation, which may be used in speech understanding, scene
analysis, game-playing or medical diagnosis. This more immediate point
of view is the one more often discussed in papers, which report on a
finished or soon-to-be-finished product. More abstractly and importantly
from an Artificial Intelligence point of view is regarding the problem-
solving process as an exploration of alternative approaches to
representation and control structure, as the instantiation or discovery
of more general concepts and theories, whose details are of lesser
importance. This point of view has been particularly emphasized in Al, a
field whose goal it is to investigate general problem-solving strategies
and wide-ranging insights into possible patterns of human thought.
This thesis studies the problem of medical diagnosis basically
from the second point of view, although it recognizes the necessitU of
paying attention to some of the details in any complex problem domain.
It attempts to fit the problem of medical diagnosis into the framework of
other AI problems and paradigms and in particular explores the notions of
pure search vs. heuri-stic methods, linearity and interaction,
plausibility and the structure of hypotheses within the not-so-mini-world
of kidney disease.
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1.1 Why Medicine?
The practical importance of studying and developing computer aide
for medical diagnosis is obvious. Doctors train for years to become
expert diagnosticians; they carry heavy responsibility for the accuracy .
of their diagnoses and the effectiveness of their treatments. Yet with
all their training, they often make mistakes because of the vast body of
ever-increasing medical knowledge they must remember and access. In a
computer, the problem of pure memory disappears, while effort.focusses
instead on methods of representation of knowledge, selection of relevant
knowledge and proper use of the selected facts.
Several diagnosis program have already been written for small
areas of medicine such as bone tumors and acute renal failure <ref>; a
group at Rutgers is currently analyzing the time course of glaucoma and
using their model to place a patient at a point along the temporal
progression of the disease and thus determine the prescribed treatment.
<ref> Programs have been written as well to investigate treatment
choices <ref - Gorry/Schwartz> and as clinical aids in adjusting
therapies. Silverman is currently working on making a program to
calculate digitalis doses more sensitive to the individual patient and
capable of using his or her reaction to the initial dose to revise its
suggestions. <ref>
More recent attempts at writing medical diagnosis programs have
been more all-encompassing, attempting to incorporate capacities for
dealing with wider varieties and larger numbers of diseases, offering
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coherent explanation of diagnoses, and containing more general models of
the time course of diseases. In addition, there has been growing
interest in the psychological processes of hypothesis-generation and
decision-making as they are reflected in medical diagnosis. Medical
educators envision better instruction for students in diagnostic skills
such as data organization and test selection as a possible result of such
research.
Another group interested in the processes involved in medical
diagnosis are the cognitive psychologists and Al researchers who are
interested in the structure of medical knowledge and the processes by
which it is manipulated as examples of general knowledge structures and
problem-solving processes.
Medicine has many characterisitcs which make it well-suited for
such theoretical exploration:
1. There is no question that the complexity of medical diagnosis
is sufficient to make it a worthwhile topic. Certainly, the data itself
is complicated (or at least massive) and even a cursory glance at the
kind and amount of processing which must occur is enough to justify:
studying it further. That there is some kind of rich structure present
at least in many doctors' minds, if not in the data itself, is evident if
we assume that diagnostic and question-asking strategies proceed from the
same data structure; no overly-simple structure will account for the
complexities of that process.
2. The final goal of a medical diagnosis system is clear, at
least on one level; we want a program which will produce the "correct"
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diagnosis (i.e. the same one as an "expert" would arrive at) at the end
of some reasonable amount of processing. This is in contrast to the
problem of defining "understanding" in a (language) understanding system.
Many attempts have been made to come up with a taxonomy of the indicators
of understanding <ref - Newell> <ref - Card>, but the job is not a small
one. On the other hand, we notice that debugging problems do have a more
clearly-defined goal:the production of a program which performs according
to some external l-stated standards. <ref - Goldstein> <ref - Sussman>
Of course, in both medicine and debugging, it is the process of arriving
at the solution in which we are ultimately interested and the standards
for judging these processes are much less well-specified or understood
(but see below, 3). Still, we have at least a first-order criterion by
which to judge diagnostic programs.
3. As mentioned above, process is of primary interest in looking
at problem-solving programs; one problem which many such theories have
had is that there was a lack of natural data giving insight into that
process. The "success" of a theory had to be judged by a comparison of
its results with the "correct" results - and independently by some
general criteria about plausible processes. In visual recognition or
language understanding, for example, there are no intermediate points in
the process about which people naturally verbalize or to which we have
any other access. The medical diagnosis process, on the other hand, is
one which occurs and is verbalized naturally; getting informal protocols
requires only sitting in on clinical sessions or listening to discussions
on rounds. More formal and complete protocols are also easily
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obtainable, since public diagnostic sessions and CPC's (see section 1.2)
are common occurrences in hospitals. In this respect, studying medical
diagnosis contrasts with taking protocols of subjects solving
cryptarithmetic problems, which uses an artificial task in an artificial
situation, as well as with language understanding or visual scene
analysis, which are certainly natural tasks, but are decision processes
to which we have no natural access.
4. Medicine contrasts with vision, although both have been
treated as recognition problems (see section 1.2), in terms of the
vocabulary available for each subject area. Much of the work which has
gone into current vision systems has been devoted to coming up with a
limited yet sufficient vocabulary to describe structures as simple as
vertices and angles and as complex as textures, curves and complex
shapes.<ref - Fahlman working paper on vocab.> Medicine, on the other
hand, comes completely equipped with a large technical (and sometimes
baroque) vocabulary, whose stated aim is, in fact, to allow exact and
accurate communication among doctors. Thus, a lot of effort has already
been devoted to making the necessary distinctions among symptoms and
disease states. We have, unfortunately, found that medical vocabulary is
sometimes more confused than one would hope - definitions may be unclear
and diseases may overlap. The basic structure, however, has already been
laid down.
5. Medical diagnosis is so large and varied a field that it
allows the construction of many different mini-worlds, the exploration of
each aiming toward the clarification of different issues. Thus a problem
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we often face in Al, that of finding an area small enough to study
completely, yet large enough to provide real chalienge, seems to be well
addressed by the choice of medical diagnosis. The subject matter in
medicine can be cut along many-different dimensions; most often it has
been limited by the selection of a small class of diseases, tests and
symptoms, as well as by focussing attention on the final diagnosis to the
exclusion of process. In addition, complicating non-technical issues
such as the representation of time were often excluded or dealt Oath
using special ad hoc mechanisms. For example, the Rutgers group has
limited their investigation to one disease - glaucoma - and is
concentrating instead on determining the stage of the disease which a
patient manifestst thus the time course of the disease is specifically
and exclusively considered. <ref> Gorry, on the other hand, chose a
larger class of possible diagnoses and handled the time of occurrence of
symptoms as one example of a general concept of interaction between
symptoms. <ref - Gorry thesis> This is not to suggest that the hard
problem of modularization has been solved in the case of medical
diagnosis - but merely to inject some hope; the sub-domains are there, if
we can only find and isolate them.
1.2 Description of the Problem
The particular aspect of medicine with which this thesis will
deal is the process of diagnosis within a limited set of diseases: those
whose presenting symptom is hematuria, or blood in the urine. We can
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conceptualize the problem as one of a class of recognition problems <ref
- Fahlman thesis prop.> in which features of the situation (called the
sample by Fahlman) act as clues to its complete description - to its
recognition as an already-known entity. In particular, a medical system
is presented with a group of symptoms, signs, facts, test results etc,
and its job is to come up with a diagnosis, an identification of a.
disease or several diseases whose manifestations most closely match the
condition of the patient. Choosing a treatment on the basis of the
diagnosis will not be included in the analysis here.
Because of an interest, mentioned above, in process, the model of
diagnosis which will be used here is one of the serial acquisition <ref -
Gorry the.> of facts about the patient. Thus, we require a diagnosis
system to have hupotheses at each point and expect that these hypotheses
will change after the addition of each new piece of information. As a
first approximation, a hypothesis can be thought of as a disease, but
several examples later will make it clear that the structure of a
hypothesis is more complicated, often including several related or
independent diseases, some of which are connected by relationships like
CAUSED-BY or COMPLICATED-BY.
A distinction is often made between two forms of data acquistion
in diagnosis : active and passive. <ref?> An active approach includes a
physician's asking a question in order to solicit each new piece of
information from a patient; clearly his or her questions will rely
heavily on the previous dialogue and the present hypothesis. A passive
mode is one in which each new piece of information is offered to the
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physician in a pre-determined order. In fact, such a technique is
actually used by doctors, who call it a CPC (clinical pathological case);
the facts of the case are pre-arranged (often in a misleading manner) and
read to a doctor who, at each stage, offers his or her current hypotheses
and the reasons behind them. CPC's, unfortunately, are.aritifici.al in
that the data is organized in ways which are foreign to a real doctor-
patient interaction and the ensuing process may be unrepresentative of a
doctor's normal strategy in making diagnoses. Thus, I have chosen to use
a variation of the active process in wchih all the data about the patient
is immedi.ately available if the physician .asks for it. This avoids
assigning risks and costs to various diagnostic procedures, hopefully
eimplifUlng the problem to some extent. In this thesis, I will
concentrate on the hypothesis-generation and evaluation aspects of the
diagnostic process. I will not consider the question-asking strategy in
detail, except as it illuminates the more general topics of data
organization and hypothesis generation. The protocol below (Chapter 2)
was taken from a session in whcih the physician actively acquired data
from the patient, although I have not included his questions in my
analysis of the interaction.
1.3 The Basic Approach
Forgetting for a moment all the complexity in hypotheses hinted
at above, we can regard the diagnosis problem as a conceptually simple
one for which, In fact, we can come up with a complete solution. We have
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a collection of symptoms and a collection of diseases; the problem in
each case is to choose the disease which is most likely causing the
particular symptoms observed. In more general terms, we have a
collection of effects and a collection of causes; the task is to find
the cause which most likely accounts for the effects present in each
particular situation. Under certain assumptions (which I will discuss
below), the solution is straightforward and represents an elementary
example of the use of probabilities. With each (disease,symptom) pair is
associated a number which represents the probability of a patient who has
the disease exhibiting the symptom. For example, if 20% of all people
suffering from the flu have aching muscles, then the number associated
with (flu, aching muscles) would be .2. Obviously, the number implicitly
associated with (flu, no aching muscles) would be .8. Then making a
diagnosis necessitates only multiplying all the probabilities associated
with present and absent symptoms for each disease - and comparing all the
results. The disease with the highest associated product is the winner
and claims the victim.
This method is obviously generalizable to any recognition problem
for which the correlations are available - given a few conditions:
1. that the symptoms are independent, in the probabilistic sense and
2. that the diseases are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Obviously, neither of these is true in the medical diagnosis case;
patients often have more than one disease and the presence of one symptom
more often than not affects the probability of the occurrence of others.
Both of these non-linearities can, theoretically, be handled in the
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probabilistic framework by considering all possible combinations of
diseases and symptoms in recording and combining probabilities. By now,
the third and most important for rejecting the above-outlined complete
theoru should be obvious: the uncontrolled proliferation of hypotheses
and associated probabilities and the explosion of computations necessary
to choose the correcti answer. Even if all the numbers necessary were
available (which they're not), this situation could become
computationally infeasible - and is certainly cognitively impossible. It
doesn't take very subtle intuition to judge that doctors: are not
maintaining up-to-date "scores" on every possible diagnosis. In
addition, when this approach is combined with similar methods for
choosing tests, the amount of processing necessary- quickly gets out of
hand.
So the 'complete theory seems untenable; the next step is to
search for ways to reduce the number of hypotheses actively entertained
at any given time and to cut down the amount of computation necessary to
keep the relative status of each hypothesis up-to-date. The emphasis of
the coming chapters will be on two stages in the movement away from a
complete but unrealistic theory toward a 'heuristic theory which seems to
model more closely: the processing which physicians probably use. A brief
summary of those two notions follows.
1.3.1 Activation vs. Deactivation : the first cut-back
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A first difference attacks mainly the route through which
hypotheses are actively considered. The complete theory postulates all
diseases as possibilities from the beginning, eliminating them as their
associated probability products go to 80. An obvious way to have fewer
active hypotheses is not to consider a disease until it is suggested by a
relevant piece of data. This has the reassuring consequence that every
current hypothesis has a 'reason for begin remembered - instead of just
lacking a reason for begin forgotten. The issues surrounding this switch
in emphasis are closely related to the concepts of 'expectation and
'evidence, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
1.3.2 Heuristics and Interaction : the second cut-back
Both the complete theory and the modification discussed above are
'uniform theories; that is, every disease and symptom is treated the
same. Some of the most powerful methods for controlling the growth of
the hypothesis space, however, are much more specialized and local. They
reflect knowledge about the non-independence of symptoms and the amount
of details pertaining to particular symptoms which is a prerequisite to
using them as reasons for considering a hypothesis. Such local pieces of
knowledge will be viewed as 'compiled information, as they are derivable
by general principles from the primitive data base of diseaseSymptom
probabilities, but are clearly more efficient and useful in their
specialized form. Chapter S contains an inventory of such interactions
between symptoms and the imperative information associated with them.
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In order to keep the number of active hypotheses at a reasonable
level, it is important in addition to stop considering those whose
plausibility has reached a low level and to avoid adding new hypotheses
on top of old ones which have not yet been discarded as useless. Such
methods are clearly 'heuristic - that is, they don't always do "the right
thing" - since any hypothesis we eliminate on heuristic grounds may
eventual ly turn out to be the correct one after all. But it seems that
physicians (and, most likely, all of us) must do everything they can to
keep their minds uncluttered and their short-term memories from
overflowing. 'Inertia and 'premature 'rejection are two such mechanisms
which will be further explored and exemplified.
1.4 Anticipations
Chapter 2 contains a protocol of a doctor-patient interaction
which illustrates many of the processes described above. The doctor is
an expert; thus, modeling his reasoning means modeling experti.se and we
can expect many examples of compiled heuristics and special techniques.
Chapter 3 describes a representational structure which we have developed
in looking at hematuria and the diseases in which it plays an important
part; the explanation of this data structure more clearly identifies the
objects and relationships in a basic medical data base. Chapter 4 /
discusses the issue of local evaluation of hypotheses, making a
distinction between 'disease-centered 'information ('expectations) and
'symptom-centered 'information ('evidence) and speculating on the place
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of each in a doctor's developing expertise. Chapter 5 catalogues some of
the interactions betwwen symptoms which contradict any stricly linear
theory of evaluation - and which exemplify the compiled information
mentioned above. Chapter 6 continues the movement from local toward
global strategies by explicitly considering the structure of both simple
and complex hypotheses and a theory of 'coherence designed to provide a
way of comparing competing hypotheses and choosing the most promising
ones. Chapter 7 summarizes the preceding view of medical diagnosis as a
'hypothesis 'generation and 'testing problem and includes some tentative
thoughts on learning and further research. The Appendix contains the
data on hematuria which was collected during this research and which
forms the basis for the protocol and other examples quoted in the
discussions.
